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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of The Case
Appellant appeals the district court's decision to dismiss his petition for
rehearing on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. He seeks reversal of
the decision. See Jon Gregory's Affidavit in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration and exhibits attached to Petitioner's Brief.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
This case centers on the Stallings, hereafter Appellee or Stallings failure to
pay Jon Gregory, hereafter Appellant or Gregory for the sale of a property which
both parties agreed to develop. Gregory purchased a two-acre parcel of land in
Rexburg, Idaho for development of student housing or other university housing
development for $205,000. However, he needed the other two-acres to develop the
project. In September 2007, Stallings contacted Gregory, expressing interest in
purchasing the other two-acre parcel and going in as joint ventures in the
development of the project. Stallings obtained a bank loan in order to finance their
share of the purchase of the other two acres, for around the same price $205,000.
As the parties were working on the development in 2008, the market in residential
and commercial properties crashed, causing economic turmoil in the United States
1

and particularly to the parties in this case. Century mortgage advised Gregory they
could not provide a draw for construction work and essentially went out of
business. Summit Development had done some initial work but were unable to
complete the project. Gregory also owned an adjacent but separate property known
as G's Dairy Delights, LLC and took the proceeds from that sale and invested them
in the project (of approximately $292,629.00), to keep the venture viable. He
began working to try and sell the property to recoup the investments that he,
Appellees, and others had invested in the properties and joint venture. He was able
to locate a buyer, Rockwell Comi Limited Partnership, who was willing to
purchase the property. Then, on February 2, 2009, Gregmy transfe1Ted his interest
to his parcel to Pioneer Point LLC, a company established to develop the property.
Later, on December 8, 2010, Pioneer Point LLC and the Stallings entered into a
construction loan with Century Mmigage Company to finance a portion of the
construction, with the work to be completed seven calendar months from that date.
On the same day, Pioneer Point LLC and the Stallings signed a promissory note of
$945,000 to multiple lenders with an agreement to pay the note within six months,
or by June 10. 2009, with the option to extend up for another six months.
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On May 2, 2012, Pioneer Point LLC transferred what had been Mr.
Gregory's property to Richard Stallings. Then, on November 14, 2012, Stallings,
through attorney Garrett Sandow, told Greg01y that he planned on taking two
draws from a sell of both parcels and would give Mr. Gregory the remaining
balance, which was $106,000 on the first draw and $150,000 on the second draw,
Exhibit M. The Stallings sold both parcels of property on December 21, 2012 to
Rockwell Court LP for $1,086,438.89. After that sale, all the mortgage investors
other than the parties were paid back their initial investments.
On September 9, 2013, Gregory was informed by Garrett Sandow, through
email, that Richard Stallings no longer intended to pay Gregory the balance of
those draws, Exhibit I. Mr. Sandow advised Gregory that he had four years from
the date of the notice to file suit against Stallings, which was the first time Stallings
had ever advised Gregory he did not plan on paying him. Until that date Gregory
had understood, from prior representations by Stallings that he would get his
money, albeit at the "end of the line". Exhibit M, dated November 14, 2012
establishes that Gregory would get his funds in two separate draws following
closing- one of $106,000.00 and a second draw of $150,000.00. Exhibit N, dated
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December 27, 2012 sets forth the amount that Stallings proposed paying Gregory
$155,482.28, over the next few months. Gregory fully anticipated that the draws
were still forthcoming, because of Stallings assurances, and the buyer was paying
out additional amounts after closing as the development progressed. Not all the
funds were paid at closing, but some were withheld as the development was
completed by the buyer. In addition, Stallings had advised Gregory that he would
be the last to be paid, and Gregory lmew the buyer was still finishing the
development stage.
Therefore, the first he knew of Stallings decision not to pay anything
occurred on September 9, 2013. On September 6, 2017, Gregory sued the Stallings
for breach of contract. The district court dismissed the case on summary judgment,
finding an oral contract did exist, but that Gregory was barred from bringing suit
due to the four-year statute of limitations on oral contracts. On January 18, 2019,
the district court denied Gregory's motion for reconsideration. Gregory timely
appealed.
ISSUE PRESENTED
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Did the court err in denying Gregory's motion for reconsideration of
summary judgement when Gregory produced enough evidence of a
genuine dispute of a material fact, that there was not a statute of
limitation violation, and when estoppel would otherwise gove1n?
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Gregory has demonstrated that a dispute of material fact exists concerning
the breach of contract date and subsequently that a statute oflimitations violation
exists. The lower court should have used a reasonable time for performance
standard when determining the breach, because no time for performance was
specified in the contract. Further the court have used a discove1y rule, as it has in
precedent, in determining the breach of contract. Finally, equitable estoppel should
have been applied in this case based on the misrepresentations of Stallings.
Because Stallings has failed to adequately rebut these assertions, this Court should
reverse the lower court's summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE LOWER COURT'S
DECISION BECAUSE STALLINGS HAS FAILED TO REFUTE
5

GREGORY'S ASSERTION THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS
IMPROPER.
Gregory previously argued reversal was warranted for three reasons: (1)
there is a dispute of material fact of when the contract was breached; (2) a
discovery rule should be applied in this case, and (3) at the very least equitable
estoppel should be applies in this case. Stallings have responded to each point, but
these responses fail to demonstrate that reversal of summary judgment is not
warranted.
A.

Standard of Review
This Court's standard of review of summary judgment is the same as the

district court's review and is gove1ned by I.R.C.P 56. Balivi Chem. Corp. v. Indus.
Ventilation, Inc., 131 Idaho 449,450,958 P.2d 606,607 (Ct. App. 1998). This
Court must determine if the documents on file with the Court illustrate a genuine
dispute of material fact. Id. Further all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from the record must be drawn in favor ofnonmoving party, Gregory. Lockheed
Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644
(2006).
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B.

Gregory disputes when payment by Stallings was supposed to occur, and
accordingly disputes when the breach of contract occurred and when the
statute of limitations began to accrue.
Because an action on a contract breach accrues at the time of breach, the

heati of this matter is when that breach occurred. Since this decided on summary
judgment, this Court must determine if there was a genuine dispute of material fact
regarding when that breach occurred.
Stallings conceded that if there was an agreement than that agreement was to
"share profits equally after consideration and repayment of their original respective
investments." Patiicularly conspicuous in this language is the lack oftimeframe of
when these monies would be distributed to each party. The absence of this
language is not particularly problematic to the contract because the law fills this
gap. When a time for performance is not specified, reasonable time is allotted for
that performance. Swafford v. Huntsman Springs, Inc., 163 Idaho 209, 213, 409
P.3d 789, 793 (2017). The question remains when that reasonable time expired and
the action accrued.
Gregory has presented evidence that he was within that reasonable time
frame based on his reliance on information that was communicated to him from
7

Stallings through attorney, Gan-ett Sandow. Gregory believed he would be paid
after all debts were paid back by Stallings. This is not only reasonable but expected
when closing out a failed joint venture.
Stallings dismisses Gregory's contention that breach occun-ed within a
reasonable time for Stalling's performance at the time of Gregory's discovery.
Stallings indicates: "Gregory's discovery of the breach is not when the breach
occun-ed ... " (Respondent's Briefp. 9). However, in a contract like this where no
time is stated, discovery is an easy way for the court to measure the breach when
there is no other time to pinpoint the breach. This court has done this before.

Swafford, 163 Idaho at 213 409 P.3d at 793. The only evidence presented that
Stallings was not going to follow through with the contract, was the email to
Gregory from Sandow. The contract had no time specification, so in summary
judgment should be liberal in construing the latest the breach could have occun-ed.
There is little support to the proposition that the breach could have only
occun-ed when Stallings received the payout in 2012 and thus the contract action
accrued. In fact, "a cause of action generally accrues 'when a party may maintain a
lawsuit against another."' a cause of action generally accrues "when a party may
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maintain a lawsuit against another." McCormack v. Caldwell, 152 Idaho 15, 20,
266 P.3d 490,495 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Western Corp. v. Vanek, 144 Idaho
150, 151, 158 P.3d 313, 314 (Ct. App. 2008)). In this case, the contract did not
indicate when each party could maintain suit. Consequently, the law fills that gap,
which in this case is reasonable time for performance. A reasonable time standard
is one usually determined by a fact finder. Since there is no evidence that
Gregory's contention of when the breach occurred is so unreasonable that a fact
finder could not find that Gregory's contention was the actual time of breach, this
court should overturn the lower court's summary judgment.
C.

The statute of limitations is not violated because the comi should apply a
"discovery rule," based in precedent, to Gregory's case.
Gregory does not ask this comi to apply any rule outside its precedent, but

instead requests that discovery rule based in precedent be applied in this case. In
another summary judgment case, this comi determined that the latest it could
reckon the date of contract breach was the date of discovery of the breach.

Swafford, 163 Idaho at 213 409 P.3d at 793. This was, of course, based on the
perhaps limited factual record that was produced for the purposes of summary
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judgment. However, this rule make sense if there is not a clear time of breach, as in
Gregory's case which was previously discussed.
Even if this Court does not want to apply a discovery rule to the merits of
this case, it should still do so in the dete1mination of summary judgment. Parties in
this case have not completed discovery, so with the limited record on hand, this
Court should defer to latest possible date of breach. Here, that is date Gregory
discovered the breach. Accordingly, this court should find the statute of limitations
were not violated or, at the very least, there is a genuine dispute of material fact
regarding when the breach occurred and dismissal on summary judgment is
improper.
D.

Even if the breach occurred when Stallings received the money, equitable
estoppel applies in this case.
Simply put, the requirements for equitable estoppel are: A person (1)

knowingly made false representation; that (2) was intended to be relied on; (3) with
the other party unable to discover the truth; and which (4) the other party relied on
to his detriment. Ferro v. Society ofSt. Pius X, 143 Idaho 538, 540, 149 P.3d 813,
815 (2006). Gregory established these requirements in regard to Stallings' actions.
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Stallings actions seem to indicate that when he told Gregory to expect two
payments after a payout to outside parties, he was never intending to live up to
those statements. It is unclear they Stallings would make those statements without
the intent for Gregory to rely on them. It is clear, Gregory suffered monetary
damage from his reliance on these statements. Finally, though Gregory was the one
who transferred his interest in the property, he no longer had access to the financial
infmmation that would put him on notice of the misrepresentation.
Gregory did pursue his case with due diligence based on the statute of
limitations defined to him by an attorney. Though that attorney was mistaken, that
does not mean that Gregory was not acting with due diligence.
At the very least, whether equitable estoppel applies in this case is a genuine
issue of material fact which would require this Court to overturn the lower court's
holding.
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CONCLUSION
Stallings failed to adequately rebut Gregory's arguments that show the
summary judgement should be oveiturned. Based on the evidence and argument
presented herein, Greg01y respectfully requests that this Com1 overturn the
decision of the district com1.
DATED this .£nd day of .9cfe2019.

DAVID N. PARMENTER, ESQ
Attorney for the Petitioner/Appellent
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